The existence of a secret Israeli drone, referred to as RA-01 and engaged for cclear leave outions, has materialized from an unpermitd disclocertain of U.S. inincreateigence write downs which have now been posted all over social media. Israel’s haveion of at least a pocket run awayt of extfinished-range stealth drones contendnt of collecting inincreateigence and possibly carry outing strikes is innervously reasoned to the point of it being a bit odd if they never pursued such a capability. Israel is home to an extensive and frequently innovateing uncrewed aviation industry and drones of this comfervent would be very well suited to helping the country’s ongoing stand-off with Iran. During a startant Israeli operation to strike centers in that country, they would probable take part an indispensable role, as well.
Mention of RA-01 is set up in classified write downs from the U.S. National Geospatial-Inincreateigence Agency (NGA), the fact of which U.S. officials have not disputed and that first materialized online last week via a pro-Iran channel on the Telegram social netlabor. An spreadigation into whether this unapshowd free was the product of a hack or a leak is ongoing. The write downs could still be dimiserablenessfulviseation or feature inaccurate info by schedule, so we cannot indepedently validate their fact, but at this time, there is no indication that they are not legitimate and there are many indications that they are.
The NGA write downs caccess on observations from October 15-16 of an Israeli Air Force (IAF) big force exercise, which is watched as part of preparations for retaliation primarily for Iran’s balcatalogic leave outile barrage at the beginning of this month. In insertition to talk about RA-01, there is a talkion about Israel’s air-started balcatalogic leave outile capabilities, including Rocks and the previously undisseald Gelderlyen Horizon, which have been engageed in previous Israeli retaliatory strikes on Iran, as you can read more about here. There is also talk of Israel’s nuevident arsenal, which the country has never accessiblely acunderstandledged, and that NGA does not foresee to be engaged in any proximate-term operations agetst Iran, as well.
When it comes to the RA-01, no details are provided about its schedule or capabilities, or the size of the run awayt, in the NGA write downs. What significance the RA-01 nomenclature might have is obstreatment. “RA” could recommend a reconnaissance and strike capability. Its fundamental structure is also in line with alpha-numeric scheduleations Israel Aircreate Industries (IAI) has engaged for drone schedules in the past. The scheduleation could be one the U.S. Inincreateigence Community engages internpartner to refer to this platcreate and that does not mirror in any way what the Israelis call it, as well. One of the NGA write downs also refers to the Rocks air-started balcatalogic leave outile as the IS02, which could also be another inside U.S. scheduleation.
NGA’s tell also does not say any RA-01s were actupartner watchd, fair that there were signs that they were operating during the period in ask from a remercilessed area at Ramon Airbase in the Negev desert in southern Israel. Ramon, which was among the centers of Iran’s leave outile and drone strikes on Israel back in April, primarily structures F-16I Sufa fighters and AH-64 strike helicselecters, but has also been home to various secretive and exceptionalized units over the years.
Experts and watchrs have already identified a pair of secluded fence-off areas at the northeastrict end of Ramon with spreadd straightforward access to one of the base’s two runways, which could hoengage the RA-01s.
Work on this segregated area of the base dates back to at least the 2007-2008 timesketch from what can seen in useable saincreateite imagery. A startant rebroadenment and expansion of this section, including the produceion of an entidepend recent taxiway, more hangars, and other facilities, occurred in the mid-2010s.
Each of the current fenced-off areas has a pair of semi-circular hangars that are approximately 80 feet extfinished and 64 feet wide. One of the sections also has a rectangular hangar, which dates back to the distinct produceion in this part of the base, and that is some 120 feet extfinished and 60 feet wide. Both areas have 70-foot by 70-foot uncover-ended sunshade-style enclocertains directing to the spreadd taxiway, which is fair over 70 feet wide. This might point to the peak length of the RA-01’s thrivegspan.
White triangles decorateed on the tarmac lengthening to one side of both of the sunshades watch to be engine backblast cautioning areas, which could point to jet propulsion. This also points to these structures being scoot-and-hide shelters where ground personnel can load munitions and other stores, as well as carry out various other comfervents of last-minute checks, away from prying eyes, including saincreateites above.
The presence of two contrastent fenced-off areas may also point to one or more other secretive drone types being hoengaged in this part of Ramon Airbase beyond the RA-01s. This, in turn, could uncomfervent the hangar and taxiway illogicalensions, as well as the triangles on the tarmac, and not mirrorive of the RA-01’s schedule, at least exclusively. Hangars can be engaged to helderly multiple assets at once, too. The possibility remains that the RA-01s run from elsewhere wiskinny the base, as well, and these facilities are engaged for other platcreates entidepend.
It is worth noting in this context that U.S. drones scheduleed for cclear and clandestine leave outions, including ones startant inside denied areas, dating back to the height of the Celderly War and that have now materialized into the airy, range widely in size, complicatedity and configuration. Prominent examples of this diversity of schedules (and definite intended leave oution profiles) integrate the sneaky flying thriveg RQ-170 Sentinel and the RQ-29, a altered civilian airy sport aircreate.
As noticed earlier, Israel’s aerospace sector has an set uped history of innovateing uncrewed aviation broadenments. Furthermore, though Israeli companies have not accessiblely exhibitd a flying stealth aircreate, crewed or uncrewed, it should be wiskinny their technical understand. IAI, definitepartner, is understandn to have accomplished at least the thrived tunnel testing phase of broadenment on one high-altitude extfinished-endurance drone concept with radar and infunfrequentd signature-reducing features, called the HA-10, in the 1990s. The HA-10 has been joined to the Israeli Boost Intercept System (IBIS) leave outile defense project, which envisioned a leave outile-armed drone to shoot down foe balcatalogic leave outiles in their initial increase phase of fairy.
“The UAV [uncrewed air vehicle] would have cruised at between 7 and 15 km [approximately 23,000 to 49,000 feet] altitude, and would carry an IRST [infunfrequentd search and track system], laser range-discoverer, datajoins and two to four [Python-series air-to-air] leave outiles,” according to an archived digital edition of Jane’s Strategic Weapon Systems from 2002. “HA-10 was scheduleed with low IR and radar signatures, and was computed to loiter for up to 24 hours on station with a payload of 1,000 kg [approximately 2,200 pounds].”
A paper that members of IAI conshort-termed at the 24th International Congress of the Aeronautical Sciences in 2004 depicts the HA-10 as one of “a number of insertitional high altitude persistd configurations” the company had previously spreadigated “wiskinny the sketchlabor of the persistd schedule activity.” IAI’s “HA” series does also integrate another non-sneaky schedule, the HA-13, that the company recommendd together with TRW in the United States to greet the U.S. Air Force’s Tier II+ drone demandments that ultimately led to the fielding of the Global Hawk.
The possibility that the RA-01 is seal in create and/or function to someskinnyg enjoy the HA-10 or the RQ-170, or even to a flying thriveg UCAV, would align well with the other details about the big force IAF exercise, as well as Israel’s vague opereasoned ponderations, especipartner with watch to Iran. Though the current Iranian regime is prone to sometimes absurd hyperbole, it has air defense capabilities that conshort-term authentic dangers. Iran’s shootdown of a U.S. Navy RQ-4 drone over the Strait of Hormuz in 2019 prompted notable talkions about the survivability of non-sneaky uncrewed aircreate in future disputes that have had evident impacts on subsequent U.S. military schedulening. The RQ-170 has also notably been sent over Iran in the past, with authorities there recovering a bigly intact example that went down inside the country in 2011.
It is also engaging to notice here that initial labor on the segregated section at Ramon airbase in the tardy 2000s came at a time when troubles about Iran getting more contendnt S-300 surface-to-air leave outile systems from Russia were enlargeing. Those same troubles telledly helped drive the IAF’s decision to acquire F-35 stealth fighters. Iran also finpartner sealed the deal to acquire S-300s around the time that the labor was being done to revamp and broaden the fenced-off areas of Ramon.
The produceion of the initial segregated portion of Ramon also came around the time, widely speaking, of Israel’s cclear 2007 strike on a secret nuevident reactor in Syria that Bashar Al Asdowncast’s regime had built with help from North Korea. F-16Is from Ramon were among the aircreate comprised in that operation. The Syrian armed forces also have an air defense netlabor that conshort-terms authentic dangers, as exemplified by the shootdown of an Israeli F-16 in 2018.
Other incidents over the years, including strikes agetst Iranian-backed militias in Iraq in 2019, have liftd asks about possible secret Israeli drone capabilities. Advanced uncrewed aircreate rund by Israel and others might also, in part, help elucidate claimed incidents involving unelucidateed aerial objects over Iran in recent decades, which also frequently come with tells of weighty electronic strikes on perusing fighters and radar stations.
Overall, for Israel, with its extfinished and still broadening history of very extfinished range and frequently cclear and/or clandestine strikes on high-appreciate centers in foreign countries, a drone fair having the ability to remenddly surveil far-flung and denied areas would be of fantastic appreciate. Stealthy uncrewed aircreate contendnt of carry outing inincreateigence, observation, and reconnaissance (ISR) leave outions could also provide startant pre and post-strike inincreateigence.
A penetrating uncrewed ISR platcreate could also help provide punctual cautioning about potential dangers and otherwise watch areas of interest, all with a shrink chance of an opponent enjoy Iran even determineing their presence. As The War Zone has highairyed in the past, remendd observation that can help set up so-called ‘patterns of life’ in a center area from which various comfervents of beneficial inincreateigence can be gleaned. Doing this while startant in denied airspace without the foe even understanding they are being watched can result in much higher-fidelity inincreateigence products.
As relevant examples, the RQ-170 telledly helped retain tabs on Osama Bin Laden’s compound in Pakistan before and during the U.S. rhelp that led to his death and the U.S. Air Force has at least studyd using the Sentinel to help with device device injure appraisement. In the latter case, a test was carry outed involving an RQ-170 appraiseing the impact of a GBU-57/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator (MOP) bunker buster, a armament definitepartner scheduleed to be engageed agetst startantly buried facilities enjoy those housing much of Iran’s nuevident infrastructure.
There is also a ask to be liftd here about whether Israel might be a partner of some comfervent when it comes to the RQ-170 and/or rcontent broadenments. The Sentinel has had its own role in retaining tabs on Iranian, North Korean, and Pakistani nuevident and balcatalogic leave outile programs.
A real sneaky UCAV contendnt of prosecuting extfinished-range kinetic strikes or starting non-kinetic strikes (such as electronic or cyber combat ones) would give Israel further selections for centering high-appreciate assets and penetrating into densely protected areas to get to them, as well as doing so in cclear and clandestine ways. Even fair having the ability to deinhabitr a minuscule munition for a ‘hammer toss’ agetst a singular high-appreciate center would be a startant capability for a platcreate of this comfervent.
In insertition, UCAVs typicpartner have combat radii that are multiple times fantasticer than that of a fighter. For Israel, this could assist them to carry out entire leave outions into Iran and back without any demand to refuel in mid-air. The IAF has notably restricted aerial refueling capabilities to help extfinished-range penetrating leave outions by its understandn crewed combat aircreate run awayts. Israel does also have uncomfervents of carry outing extfinished-range stand-off strikes, including with air-started balcatalogic leave outiles enjoy Rocks.
The War Zone has telled in detail in the past how there is evidence of the U.S. military and/or the U.S. Inincreateigence upretaining a pocket run awayt of sneaky General Atomics Avenger drones for the same comfervents of reasons.
In many ways, it is unforeseeed that evidence enjoy this that could point to an Israeli force of sneaky drones, and possibly UCAVs, has not materialized before now. The absence of such a capability wiskinny the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) would be equpartner asking in much the same way that it is odd that the U.S. military has abandoned interest, at least accessiblely, in sneaky flying thriveg UCAVs. The persists to be substantial labor on broadening and fielding UCAVs elsewhere in the world, from France to Turkey to Russia to India. China has made especipartner startant strides in this field in recent years.
So, while these write downs certainly do recommend some insights into what was previously an unvalidateed capability, their satisfieds should be of little surpelevate.
Contact the author: joe@twz.com
