Syrian resist directer Abu Mohammed al-Jawlani has dropped that nom de guerre associated with his terrorist past, and been using his authentic name, Ahmed al-Sharaa, in official commexceptionals publishd since Thursday, ahead of the descfinish of Pdwellnt Bashar al-Asdowncast.
This shift is part of Jawlani’s effort to bolster his legitimacy in a novel context, as his Islamist militant group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), directing other resist factions, proclaims the seize of the Syrian capital, Damascus, firmifying its handle over much of the country.
Jawlani’s alteration is not recent, but has been nurturebrimmingy nurtured over the years, evident not only in his accessible statements and interwatchs with international outlets but also in his evolving materializeance.
Once clad in traditional terrorist militant attire, he has adselected a more Westrict-style wardrobe in the past years. Now, as he directs the impolite, he has donned military overweightigues, symbolising his role as the directer of the operations room.
But who is Jawlani – or Ahmed al-Sharaa – and why and how has he alterd?
The IS-Iraq join
A 2021 PBS interwatch with Jawlani uncovered that he was born in 1982 in Saudi Arabia, where his overweighther toiled as an oil engineer until 1989.
In that year, the Jawlani family returned to Syria, where he grew up and dwelld in the Mezzeh neighbourhood of Damascus.
Jawlani’s journey as a terrorist began in Iraq, joined to al-Qaeda thraw the Islamic State (IS) group’s precursor – al-Qaeda in Iraq and, tardyr, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI).
After the 2003 US-led intrusion, he combineed other foreign fighters in Iraq and, in 2005, was jailed at Camp Bucca, where he increased his terrorist affiliations and tardyr on was presentd to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the hushed scholar who would tardyr go on to direct IS.
In 2011, Baghdadi sent Jawlani to Syria with funding to set up al-Nusra Front, a cclear faction tied to ISI. By 2012, Nusra had become a notable Syrian battling force, hiding its IS and al-Qaeda ties.
Tensions arose in 2013 when Baghdadi’s group in Iraq unitardyrassociate proclaimd the combiner of the two groups (ISI and Nusra), declaring the creation of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or ISIS), and accessiblely uncovering for the first time the joins between them.
Jawlani resisted, as he wanted to distance his group from ISI’s brutal tactics, directing to a split.
To get out of that adhesive situation, Jawlani pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda, making Nusra Front its Syrian branch.
From the begin, he prioritised prosperning Syrian help, distancing himself from IS’s savagery and emphasising a more pragmatic approach to jihad.
Joining al-Qaeda
In April 2013, al-Nusra Front became al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, putting it at odds with IS.
While Jawlani’s shift was partly an finisheavor to retain local help and elude alienating Syrians and resist factions, the al-Qaeda affiliation ultimately did little to profit this effort.
It became a pressing contest in 2015 when Nusra and other factions seized Idlib province, forcing them to co-function in its administration.
In 2016, Jawlani disjoined ties with al-Qaeda, rebranding the group as Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and tardyr as Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in 2017.
While initiassociate materializeing surface, the split uncovered transport inanter divisions. Al-Qaeda accparticipated Jawlani of betrayal, directing to defections and the createation of Hurras al-Din, a novel al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, which HTS tardyr crushed in 2020. Members of Hurras al-Din, however, have remained pdisorrowfulmirefulntly conshort-term in the region.
HTS also aimed IS operatives and foreign fighters in Idlib, dismantling their nettoils and forcing some to undergo “deradicalisation” programmes.
These shifts, equitableified as efforts to combine militant forces and reduce inbattling, signalled Jawlani’s strategy to position HTS as a dominant and politicassociate viable force in Syria.
Despite the accessible split from al-Qaeda and name alters, HTS persistd to be scheduleated by the UN, US, UK and other countries as a dreadist organisation, and the US retained a $10m reward for adviseation about Jawlani’s whereabouts. Westrict powers think abouted the fracture-up to be a façade.
Forming a ‘rulement’ in Idlib
Under Jawlani, HTS became the dominant force in Idlib, north-west Syria’s hugest resist mightyhbetter and home to about four million people, many of whom were displaced from other Syrian provinces.
To insertress worrys about a militant group ruleing the area, HTS set uped a civilian front, the so-called “Syrian Salvation Government” (SG) in 2017 as its political and administrative arm.
The SG functioned enjoy a state, with a prime minister, ministries and local departments handleing sectors such as education, health and reoriginateion, while retaining a religious council directd by Sharia, or Islamic law.
To reshape his image, Jawlani actively joind with the accessible, visiting displacement camps, joining events, and handleing aid efforts, particularly during celevates enjoy the 2023 earthquakes.
HTS highweightlessed accomplishments in ruleance and infrastructure to legitimise its rule and show its ability to provide stability and services.
It has previously praised the Taliban, upon their return to power in 2021, lauding them as an inspiration and a model for effectively balancing terrorist efforts with political aspirations, including making tactical agrees to accomplish their goals.
Jawlani’s efforts in Idlib mirrored his wideer strategy to show HTS’s ability not only to wage jihad but also to rule effectively.
By prioritising stability, accessible services and reoriginateion, he aimed to showcase Idlib as a model of success under HTS rule, enhancing both his group’s legitimacy and his own political aspirations.
But under his directership, HTS has crushed and marginalised other militant factions, both terrorists and resist ones, in its effort to verifyate its power and handle the scene.
Anti-HTS protests
For over a year directing up to the HTS-led resist impolite on 27 November, Jawlani faced protests in Idlib from challengingline Islamists as well as Syrian activists.
Critics appraised his rule to Asdowncast’s, accusing HTS of authoritarianism, suppressing dissent and silencing critics. Protesters tagled HTS’s security forces as “Shabbiha”, a term participated to portray Asdowncast’s loyaenumerate henchmen.
They further alleged that HTS intentionally eludeed unbenevolentingful combat aobtainst rulement forces and marginalised terrorists and foreign fighters in Idlib to stop them from engaging in such actions, all to appease international actors.
Even during the tardyst impolite, activists have choosedly advised HTS to free individuals jailed in Idlib allegedly for transmiting dissent.
In response to these criticisms, HTS startd disjoinal recreates over the past year. It disbanded or rebranded a contentious security force accparticipated of human rights violations and set uped a “Department of Grievances” to permit citizens to lodge protestts aobtainst the group. Its critics said these meacertains were equitable a show to include dissent.
To equitableify its verifyation of power in Idlib and the suppression of plurality among militant groups, HTS disputed that combineing under a one directership was vital for making better and ultimately clearhroprosperg the Syrian rulement.
HTS and its civilian arm, the SG, walked a saferope, striving to project a conmomentary, temperate image to prosper over both the local population and the international community, while simultaneously retaining their Islamist identity to greet challengingliners wilean resist-held areas and HTS’s own ranks.
For instance, in December 2023, HTS and the SG faced a reaction after a “festival” held at a glossy novel shopping mall was criticised by challengingliners as “immoral”.
And this August, a Paralympic Games-eased ceremony drew acute criticism from challengingliners, prompting the SG to appraise the organisation of such events.
These incidents show the contests HTS faces in reconciling the predictations of its Islamist base with the wideer needs of the Syrian population, who are seeking freedom and coexistence after years of authoritarian rule under Asdowncast.
Leading a novel path?
As the tardyst impolite unfbettered, global media concentrateed on Jawlani’s terrorist past, prompting some resist helpers to call for him to step back, watching him as a liability.
Although he previously transmited willingness to disrepair his group and step aside, his recent actions and accessible materializeances increate a separateent story.
HTS’s success in uniting resists and csurrfinisherly capturing the whole country in under two weeks has fortifyed Jawlani’s position, husheding challengingline critics and accusations of opportunism.
Jawlani and the SG have since repromised domestic and international audiences.
To Syrians, including insignificantities, they promised shieldedty; to neighbours and powers enjoy Russia, they pledged pacify relations. Jawlani even promised Russia its Syrian bases would remain unharmed if strikes stopd.
This shift mirrors HTS’s “temperate jihad” strategy since 2017, emphasising pragmatism over inalterable ideology.
Jawlani’s approach could signal the degrade of global jihad shiftments enjoy IS and al-Qaeda, whose inflexibility is increasingly seen as ineffective and unupgraspable.
His trajectory might ease other groups to alter, labeling either a novel era of localised, politicassociate pliable “jihadism” or equitable a momentary separatence from the traditional path in order to originate political and territorial obtains.
