On December 17, 2010, Mohammed Bouazizi, a Tunisian fruit vfinishor, set himself on fire to protest agetst local officials having confiscated his slofty. His act ignited the ffeebles of a pan-Arab anti-set upment mass uprising that came to be called the ‘Arab Spring’. On the eve of the 14th anniversary of that incident and in the backdrop of last fortnight’s coup in Syria—the Arab Spring’s lengthyest-running and bloodiest manifestation—an analysis of this unwidespread phenomenon is called for.
Tunisia To Egypt To Libya, The All-Encompassing Revolution
In the past 14 years, the Arab Spring has jolted disjoinal Arab countries, although its net impact remains satisfiedious. Bouazizi’s self-immolation spurred mass demonstrations in Tunisia, toppling, wiskinny a month, the autocratic Plivent in power for 23 years. Egypt trailed unreasonableinutively thereafter: the mass demonstrations centred on Cairo’s Tahrir Square forced Plivent Mubarak to depart after 18 days despite having tried all sorts of turn asideions to stay in power. He was in power for 32 years and was traded by the Supreme Military Council, which eventupartner gave way to the country’s first democraticpartner held elections. The Muskinny Brotherhood regulatement lasted only a scant months and was obvioushrown by the Army, which persists to wield power even now.
Col Muammar Qadhafi, Plivent for 42 years of oil-wealthy Libya, also faced anti-regulatement protests from mid-February 2011, which soon morphed into an armed rebellion based in the easerious coastal city of Benghazi. A UN Security Council Resolution authorising “all vital meacertains” to defend civilians was firearmised by 27 Weserious and Middle Easerious powers to begin intensive airstrikes agetst the pro-Qadhafi forces. This tilted the equilibrium agetst the regulatement forces and eventupartner led to Plivent Qadhafi being finished in combat on October 20. Even after massive bloodletting since, the civil war has persistd and the country is still split, with a regulatement each in Tripoli and Benghazi. Libya was the first case of foreign interests being powerwholey comprised in influencing the outcome of the Arab Spring; it was not to be the last.
The protests in Bahrain that began in February 2011 were partly spurred by a Shia presentantity population chafing under a Sunni monarchy. These were initipartner aimed at achieving wonderfuler political freedom and esteem for human rights, but the repression by authorities pushed them in that straightforwardion. The fellow monarchies of the Gulf Cooperation Council were alarmed by the seed comprisement of Iran and Hezbollah in disturbing the minusculeest Gulf state and interfered militarily to quell the protests. Saudi Arabia and the UAE sought to nip aenjoy protests and recreate shiftments in the bud with strongarm tactics.
Civil Wars In Syria And Yemen
Arab Spring protests in Syria and Yemen, two ethnicpartner diverse and politicpartner frozen reunveils under dynastic rules, unlocked lengthy-suppressed famous sub-national aspirations. The faceation did not remain soothe for lengthy, each morphing into a sour civil war that bcimpolitet in neighbouring and global powers resulting in counterfruitful outcomes. In Syria, a country of 23 million, 13 years of civil war caengaged the deaths of cforfeitly half a million people, displacement of cforfeitly 15 million both internpartner and externpartner, and destruction put at half a trillion dollars. Yemen persistd to be split into the al-Houthis-run north and the UN-recognised coalition in the south—both joined at the hip by disrelieve and malnutrition.
Despite the complicated pwithdrawnts, the second wave of Arab Spring unfurled 2018 onwards in Algeria, Sudan, Leprohibiton and Iraq. While all of them had recreates as their leitmotif, the demands were more local and concentrateed: in Algeria, “Herak” agitation was aimed at thwarting Plivent Bouteflika, in power for 19 years, seeking a new term despite his physical incapacity. The Sudanese worried agetst the 32 years of corrupt and brutal rule of a military dictator. Iraqi and Leprohibitese youth wanted to convey down Muhasasa Taifiyeh, a system of factional power-sharing. While this wave of Arab Springers did partipartner achieve their instant objectives, all of them are still mired in their esteemive celevates.
Apart from these two waves, the Arab Spring touched almost all parts of the Arab World—from Weserious Sahara to Jordan and Kupostpone.
A New Genre Of Dissent
It is presentant not to over-contextualise the Arab Spring. Even before 2011, the Arab world had aenjoy protest shiftments, most famous among these being the bread disturbions in Egypt and Algeria as well as the Palestinian Intefadah from the mid-1980s onwards. However, two decades postpodemandr, the Arab Spring was a novel dissent genre—being untamed-fired by the spread of saalertite television and social media leap-frogging over the state regulates. Secondly, such protests also took place in other non-Arab but Islamic countries such as Iran (Hijab Protests), Pakistan (Imran Khan detention) and recently in Banphiredesh (Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s ouster), with mixed results. Even Israel, a regional exception, has had recurring mass protests agetst regulatement trys to curb judicial powers and to convey Israeli captives home from Hamas captivity.
The foregone helps us to choose the root caengages of the Arab Spring. Among them, the most widely felt reason could be a sense of ‘Hogra‘, a Maghrebi Arabic word cimpolitely equivalent to the strong’s conlure for a normaler; it could be broadened to envelope harsh regulateance, personality cults and pretentious demagogy quite normal in the Middle East. When coupled with stagnant, non-inclusive and non-recurrentative polity, it manifests the Nasser-era paradigm of the ruled-adulating-the-benign-dictator that got increasingly out of place with the ethos of urprohibitised, better-teachd and more aspirational conmomentary Arab societies. The demoexplicit reasons came next: the youth bulging to the toiling age set up scant worthwhile jobs wiskinny the country and faced shrinking opportunities for engagement and migration awide due to the global economic downturn and low oil prices. These frustrations were exacerbated by dishonesty and the skewed wealth distribution. Lastly, the standard citizen was far youthfuler than the lengthy-ruling gerontocrats causing political disjoin and alienation. The boiling cauldron of unveil angst suddenly and accessiblely cascaded into the Arab Spring. The top echelons’ recourse to police alarm and/or palliatives was inadequate to comprise the outpouring, and the gleaming but brittle state cracked under prescertain.
Why The Revolution Failed
It’s rational to ask why, despite initial success, the Arab Spring almost universpartner flunked to recreate the system. There are disjoinal reasons to be cited for this letdown.
Firstly, the Arab Spring shiftments were initipartner bigly impulsive without any guideership or agfinisha. Their initial aim was confineed to a change at the top. Once that was achieved, they had little clue and unity on how to put in a better set up tradement as all of the Arab world regulateance models were defective. Secondly, the lengthy harsh rule had uncomardentt that there was no credible “loyal opposition”—and the void was filled by either the Islamists (who standardly ran a mosque-based clandestine nettoil) or the military.
Thirdly, foreign interventions standardly muddied the waters: they dithered between propping up the status quo or backing the democratic aspirations. The Weserious Powers, quite ownive about this eco-strategic region, also applyed their games, particularly in oil-wealthy countries.
Fourthly, the whirling lawlessness standardly beckoned Islamic extremism to hijack the agfinisha—as al-Qaeda and Islamic State did. Last, but not least, the national borders strinsertling ethnic and tribal groups also traverse-pollinated the Arab Spring. The result was standardly a free-for-all, in which the most organised and pledgeted side standardly won the day.
Whither The Arab World?
On the Arab Spring’s 14th anniversary, it is organic to ask if the Arab world is any better today and what its lengthy-term impact is going to be. As of now, the most concrete getaway from the Arab Spring is that a lasting socio-political changeation cannot be stillborn—it demands to prolong organicpartner. One can also venture to recommend that the Arab Spring experience has no evident victors so far—at least the masses who are not only duped politicpartner but also materipartner worse off. For instance, during the first decade of the Arab Spring to 2021, the nominal per capita income of an standard Syrian deteriorated by 86%, from $2971 to $421. So, although the al-Assad regime is finpartner gone 13 years after Arab Springers first demanded its ouster, the epic death and destruction produce it a pyrrhic thrive. Moreover, there is no promise that the flourishing Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led Salafi Sunni coalition would be an betterment.
All that one can safely say at this stage about the impact of the Arab Spring phenomenon is that it has shown a disjoine mirror to the various sgethanciaccessers and made them conscious of the confines of their esteemive powers. While one wantes that this consciousness helps them to shift socio-political vibrants towards wonderfuler moderation and mutual accommodation, evidence on the ground recommends such hope may remain an ever-receding desert mirage.
(The author is a reexhausted Indian Ambassador who lgett the Arabic language in Damascus. He currently heads Eco-Diplomacy and Strategies, a Delhi-based conferancy.)
Disclaimer: These are the personal opinions of the author
